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STATE CONTROL OF BAIT ADVERTISING*
BAIT advertising, a widely used consumer-enticement technique only re-
cently brought to official attention, may prove to be among the most difficult of
misleading promotional devices to control. The common law was inadequate
to prevent extravagant or unconscionable claims by a seller.' Although a
consumer induced by such claims to purchase goods could conceivably bring
an action for deceit, he was hampered by the doctrine of caveat emptor -
and by requirements that he prove his reliance upon the claim,3 actual
damages, 4 and, most difficult, that the seller had knowledge of the falsity
of his representation. 5 Warranty actions also met with little success, for
not only did the purchaser have to prove reliance, 6 but the language in issue
might itself be excluded from evidence if not embodied in the written contract
of sale.7 Furthermore, the aggrieved party was often unable or unwilling
*People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461, 158 N.E.2d 699, 186 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1959).
1. See BEER, FEDERAL TRADE LAW AND PRAcricE § 112 (1942); Legal Opinion of
H. D. Niins, Printer's Ink, Nov. 16, 1911, p. 6; Handler, False and Misleading Adverlis-
ing, 39 YAnE L.J. 22 (1929).
2. Under this doctrine no actionable misrepresentation was possible if the parties were
dealing at arm's length, Burwash v. Ballou, 230 Ill. 34, 82 N.E. 355 (1907), had equal
means of information, and were equally qualified to judge the value of the property sold,
Poland v. Brownell, 131 Mass. 138 (1881). See generally Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim
Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
3. Carpeter v. Hamilton, 18 Cal. App. 2d 69, 62 P.2d 397 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936). The
purchaser also had to believe the representation to be true. E.g., McIntyre v. Lyon, 325
Mich. 167, 37 N.W.2d 903 (1949).
4. Nominal damages will not support an action for deceit. E.g., Castleman v. Stryker,
107 Ore. 48, 213 Pac. 436 (1923) ; HARPE'a & JAMES, ToRTs § 7.15 (1956).
5. E.g., Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N.E. 625 (1922); Roome
v. Sonona Petroleum Co., 111 Kan. 633, 635, 208 Pac. 255, 256 (1922).
The cases in which a plaintiff in a deceit action recovered for misrepresentations In
advertisements usually involved such other factors as hazardous instrumentalities. See, e.g.,
Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N.Y. 78, 75 N.E. 1089 (1905).
6. Harrington v. Smith, 138 Mass. 92 (1884) ; UNIFORM SALES Act § 12. Warranty
also requires a showing of privity. See Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d. 348, 161 P.2d
305 (1945) ; PROSSER, ToRTs 507-08 (2d ed. 1955). But see Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). See also Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Neg-
ligence, or Warranty, 42 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1929) (indicating that deceit and warranty
often overlap).
7. See Note, 29 CoLum. L. REv. 805 (1929).
Another common law remedy was recission. But a purchaser may no longer be able
to return the goods. Handler, supra note L See generally 5 WILLISTON, CONTACTS §§
1454-55 (rev. ed. 1937).
Possibly the state could convict such a seller of the crime of obtaining money under
false pretenses. But this crime has the same elements as deceit, as well as the greater
evidential burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Handler, supra note 1, at 28;
Legal Opinion of H. D. Nims, mpra note 1.
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to sue.8 The growth of large scale advertising compounded the problem, and
generated agitation for consumer protection by public authorities. This move-
ment culminated with the drafting, in 1911, of the Printer's Ink model statute,
presently enacted in various forms by forty-five states. The act-named after
the advertising publication which sponsored it-makes "untrue, misleading, or
deceptive" advertising a misdemeanor; a violation is committed by dissem-
inating such an advertisement with the intent to sell merchandise even though
no sale is made.9 Although the burden of preventing deceptive advertising
has been shifted from private litigants to state officials, the act has not suc-
8. FAiNSOD & GoanoN, GOveRxENT AND THE AmmucA\, Econoys 199 (1941);
Note, The Reguadion of Advertising, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 1018, 1060 (1956).
9. The text of the model statute is set out in THAYE , LEGAL CoNTEOL OF THE PaREss
§ 87, at 606 (3d ed. 1956) :
Any person, firm, corporation, or association [or agent or employee thereof], who,
with intent to sell, [purchase] or in any wise dispose of, [or to contract with refer-
ence to] merchandise, [real estate,] service, [employment,] or anything offered by
such person, firm, corporation or association, [or agent or employee thereof,] direct-
ly or indirectly, to the public for sale, [purchase,] distribution, [or the hire of per-
sonal services,] or with intent to increase the consumption of [or to contract with
reference to any merchandise, real estate, securities, service, or employment], or to
induce the public in any manner to enter into any obligation relating thereto, or to
acquire title thereto, or any interest therein, [or to make any loan,] makes, pub-
lishes, disseminates, circulates, or places before the public, or causes, directly or in-
directly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the pub-
lic, in this state, in a newspaper, [magazine] or other publication, or in any form
of a book, notice, circular, pamphlet, letter, handbill, poster, bill, [sign, placard,
card, label, or over any radio or television station or other medium of wireless
communication,] or in any other way [similar or dissimilar to the foregoing], an
advertisement, [announcement, or statement] of any sort regarding merchandise,
securities, service, [employment,] or anything so offered [for use, purchase, or sale,
or the interest, terms, or conditions upon which such loan will be made] to the
public, which advertisement contains any assertion, representation or statement of
fact which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
The bracketed portions were added in 1945 but have not been adopted in most states.
Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 1018, 1058 n245 (1956).
The model statute was drafted by Harry D. Nims, Esq., and first appeared in Printer's
Ink, Nov. 23, 1911, p. 68. The only states without Printer's Ink statutes are Alaska,
Arkansas, Delaware, Mississippi, and New Mexico. Several municipalities have also
adopted the statute. Note, The Regtaktidn. of Advertising, 56 COLtnx. L. Ra'. 1018, 1093-
99 n.243 (1956). The statute's early history is discussed in Comment, 36 YALE LEJ. 1155
(1927) ; 17 CoLum. L. Rav. 258 (1917). See generally 1 CAL.mANN, UNFAma Comvw-n-
TION AND TaDEz-MA.xs § 18.2(a) (1) (2d ed. 1950); RoPEa, STATE ADvrrisno
LEcasr.xTiow (1945) ; Legislation, 39 COLUm. L Ray. 264 (1939).
Printer's Ink has been held constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power. State
v. Schaengold, 13 OHio L. REP. 130 (Munic. Ct. 1915), 89 A.LR. 1004 (1934); Jasnow-
ski v. Judge of Recorder's Court, 192 Mich. 139, 158 NAV. 229 (1916); Commonwealth
v. Reilly, 248 Mass. 1, 142 N.E. 915 (1924) ; Parisian Co. v. Williams, 203 ALa. 378, 83
So. 2d 122 (1919) (dictum). But see Pincus v. State, 126 Tex. Crim. 188, 70 S.V2d 417
(1934) (invalidating portion of Texas statute imposing liability upon persons who reason-
ably should have known their statements to be false).
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cessfully curbed abuses.Y0 Local prosecutors rarely invoke the statute against
classic forms of unfair advertising ;"l subtle variants, until recently, never had
to face the possibility of being within the act.
Such a variant is bait advertising. 12 A bait seller seeks to attract customers
by advertising at a spectacularly low price a product which he does not intend
to sell.13 Once contact has been made, the seller will endeavor to switch the
customer to another item on which the profit margin is greater,14 and will
prevent or discourage purchases of the unprofitable "bait" by disparagement
or sabotage.' 5 Thirteen states have specifically prohibited this technique-
10. Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 CoLTJm. L. REy. 1018, 1063 & n.278
(1956). See Special Committee to Study the New York State Antitrust Laws, 1959 Re-
port by the Committee on New York State Antitnst Law, in N.Y. STATE BAit Ass'N,
1959 ANTITRUST LAw Symposluas 186-89 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 Committee
Report].
11. See ibid. But it has been said that the act's "greatest value to the Better Business
Bureau, the agency established for its enforcement, has been as a club to be used when
moral suasion has failed." Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39 YAi.z L.J. 22,
34 (1929).
12. "For many years bait advertising has been one of the nation's foremost retailing
problems." National Better Business Bureau, Serv. Bull. No. 250, The Fight Against Bait
Advertising, April 1956, p. 1, on file in Yale Law Library [hereinafter cited as The Fight
Against Bait Advertising]. It "is a scheme which has been made possible only by com-
paratively recent developments in mass communication and advertising, particularly tele-
vision." Electrolux v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E.2d 197, 206, 190 N.Y.S.2d
977 (1959). The Better Business Bureaus get hundreds of thousands of complaints about
bait advertising each year and more than one-half the complaints the FCC Lets concern-
ing radio and television ads involve bait advertising. Walker, Beware of the "Bait-Ad"
Gyp, Reader's Digest, Aug. 1953, p. 98. In the first half of 1956, the Better Business
Bureau of New York City had 80,336 inquiries and complaints involving bait advertising.
This was a 17% increase over a similar period in 1955. Statement of Hugh R. Jackson,
President, N.Y. Better Business Bureau, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1956, p. 39, col. 2. Bait
advertising is primarily used in the sales of home appliances, furniture, television sales
and service, home improvements and maintenance, new and used cars, storm windows, toys
and novelties, women's infants' apparel, and home furnishings. Ibid.
The first case using the generic term "bait advertising" was decided in 1935. Semler
v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935). The name was not
used again in a reported court case until 1954. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 120 F.
Supp. 128 (W.D. Okla. 1954), aff'd in part, reVd in part, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Earlier
cases which appear to involve bait advertising, although not so labeled, are Rude v. United
States, 74 F.2d 673 (1.935) ; Ritholz v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 339, 35 S.E.2d 210 (1945).
13. FTC, Guides Against Bait Advertising, 24 Fed. Reg. 9755 (1959); The Fight
Against Bait Advertising 1.
14. FTC, Guides Against Bait Advertising, 24 Fed. Reg. 9755 (1959) ; FTC, Press
Release, Bargain On a String, Dec. 4, 1955; Buschman, Bait Ads, 1954, p, 4; Buschman,
The Great Sewing Machine Racket, 1956, p. 6 (these last two are Better Business Bureau
publications.)
15. Among the more prominent methods are: (1) "knocking" or making derogatory
remarks about the advertised merchandise; (2) making no effort to sell the advertised
merchandise; (3) showing the advertised item to be of an inferior quality; (4) not hav-
ing the advertised merchandise available; (5) tampering with the advertised item so it
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"a bargain on a string"--by new legislation or amendment of their Printer's
Ink statutes.'7 Others, however, afford no protection against bait advertising
unless it falls within the prohibitions of the unamended act.
People v. Glubo '8 constitutes the first reported attempt to apply a Printer's
Ink statute-here the New York version 19-to bait advertising.O Defend-
ants advertised "Queen Ann console" sewing machines, equipped with the
"magic stitcher," over television 21 at twenty-nine dollars and fifty cents, but
had decided that under no circumstances would they sell these machines. In
answer to every inquiry about the advertised product they would send out a
"lead man" to take the customer's order and deposit. Shortly thereafter,
a second salesman would visit the customer, ostensibly to deliver the machine.
Instead, he would attempt to convince the customer that the magic stitcher
machine was defective and of inferior construction and would then try to
switch the customer to a "quality" model at a higher price.3 If the customer
will not operate properly; (6) using limited guarantees or alleging unavailability of parts
or repair service. The Fight Against Bait Adveri.sing 2-3. For additional techniques see
FTC, Guides Against Bait Advertising, 24 Fed. Reg. 9755 (1959).
16. FTC, Press Release, Bargain on a String. Dec. 4, 1955.
17. These statutes all define the forbidden conduct as offering with "intent not to
sell." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE AleN. § 17500; GA. -CODE ANN. § 106-501 (Supp. 1958) ;
HAwA I R v. LAws § 289-15.3 (1955); ILT. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 249a (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1.958); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 198 (1957); MlAss. ANN. LAws ch. 266, § 91A
(1956); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.222 (1954); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 561.665 (Supp.
1959) ; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 396; OHio REv. CODE Aim. § 2911.41 (Page Supp. 1959) ;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4869 (Supp. 1959); RI. GEN. LAws ArnN. § 11-18-10 (1956);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1945 (1955). As yet, there have been no reported prosecutions
under these statutes. For statutes which could be easily used against certain forms of bait
advertising, see Oma. REv. STAT. §§ 646210-230 (1955) (unlawful to advertise "fake sale"
which includes limited quantity not mentioned in advertisement or offering different brands
than advertised) ; UTAII CODE ANN. § 13-5-8 (1953) (unlawful to advertise merchandise
not prepared to supply) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-2124 (Supp. 1959) (falsely advertising
includes failure to reveal material facts). These statutes, however, have not been so used.
18. 5 N.Y2d 461, 158 N.E.2d 699, 186 N.Y.S2d 26 (1959), affirming 5 App. Div.
2d 527, 534, 174 N.Y.S.2d 159, 165 (1958).
19. N.Y. PEN. LAw § 421.
20. The Printer's Ink statute has been applied to bait advertising in at least one un-
reported case. Printer's Ink, Dec. 29, 1927, p. 167.
21. The television broadcasts originated from a station in Newark, N.J. The broad-
casts were relayed from the Empire State Building in New York City and were heard
throughout the entire metropolitan New York area. 5 N.Y2d at 466-67; 158 N.E.2d at
702, 186 N.Y.S2d at 31.
22. The advertised machine was actually of poor quality. It was cast iron, small,
noisy, and vibrated badly. 5 App. Div. 2d at 534, 174 N.Y.S2d at 165.
Among the techniques used to discourage sales were the following: The salesman told
the customer the television set had to be shut off as operation of the machine might cause
the TV tube or fuses to blow out; that the machine would have to be oiled every few
minutes; that five pounds of grease would be needed to pack the bearings; and that the
customer could lose an eye if the machine jammed and the needle broke. If these tactics
did not discourage the customer, the advertised machine was rigged so that the salesman
could operate it but would jam when the customer tried. Furthermore, the salesmen were
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insisted upon purchasing the cheap machine, the salesman would allege that
the machine he had bought was a demonstrator model, reclaim it, and promise
that another would be delivered. A machine would never be sent, however;
rather, the customer's deposit Would be mailed back to him. As a result of
these practices defendants were convicted of conspiring to violate Printer's
Ink.2 3
In sustaining this conviction, the Court of Appeals held that the three ele-
ments of the offense-intent to sell merchandise, advertising to the public with
such intent, and the existence in that advertisement of deceptive or misleading
matter-had been proved. 24 The court rejected defendant's contention that
bait advertising could not be brought within the statute since the products in-
tended to be sold (the more expensive machines) were not the products adver-
tised (the $29.50 machines). "Intent" was interpreted to mean intent to sell any
merchandise whatsoever, even if unadvertised. Indeed, it was apparently
intent to sell sewing machines other than those advertised which in the court's
view rendered the advertisement deceptive and misleading. Defendants also
argued that since the legislature had, subsequent to the passage of Printer's
Ink-in fact, subsequent to their trial-specifically empowered the attorney
general to enjoin bait advertising,25 the legislature did not believe activity
such as theirs to be within the original act. But the court regarded the new
statute as making already criminal behavior civilly enjoinable, a pattern "not
without precedent. '26
Glubo's interpretation of the Printer's Ink statute, then, allows states battling
bait advertising to employ a weapon already in their arsenals. Reasoning from
instructed not to sell the advertised machine under any circumstances and they earned
commissions only upon the sales of the higher priced machine. 5 N.Y.2d at 467, 158 N.E.
2d at 703, 186 N.Y.S2d at 32.
23. Defendants were also indicted for false advertising. This count was dismissed by
the trial court on the ground that "as a matter of law ...no crime was committed in
Kings County." Id. at 466-67, 158 N.E.2d at 702, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
Each of the individual defendants was sentenced to a fine of $500 or 90 days, and a
suspended fourth months in city prison. The corporate defendant was fined $500. Id. at
467, 158 N.E.2d at 702, 186 N.Y.S2d at 31.
24. The Appellate Division found the defendants had a prima fade intent to sell the
advertised merchandise at the time the advertisement was broadcast. 5 App. Div. 2d at
540, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 167. This theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals. "[S]ection
421 requires proof of an 'actual intent' to sell as distinguished from a 'prima facie intent,'
'visible intent' or 'ostensible present intent.'" 5 N.Y.2d at 470, 158 N.E.2d at 705, 186
N.Y.S.2d at 34-35.
25. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 396.
26. 5 N.Y.2d at 473, 158 N.E.2d at 706-07, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
Defendants also relied upon the Governor's message to the legislature, prior to the
passage of N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 396, in which he stated that various district attorneys
had informed him that bait advertising was not covered by existing laws. N.Y. Sess. Laws
1958, at 1808 (McKinney). The court replied that its function of construing statutes would




the act, the criteria of which are written in the disjunctive, the court's con-
struction seems irreproachable; even if advertising for sale a product which
under all circumstances will not be sold does not constitute an "untrue" repre-
sentation, it would seem to be "deceptive," or at least, "misleading." None-
theless, application of Printer's Ink to bait advertising might not comport with
the original understanding. Of course, it can be argued that considerations
of underlying intent are of no moment when the conduct questioned fits as
neatly into relevant legislation as does bait advertising into Printer's Ink. But
Printer's Ink is a criminal statute; in order properly to interpret such a law,
courts should carefully consider what acts the legislature meant to prosecute.27
The only available evidence indicates that the draftsman of the Printer's
Ink model statute was not concerned with the sincerity or insincerity of the
advertiser's offer to sell, but with the consumer's inability, in an age of mass
production and mass distribution, accurately to ascertain the quality of pur-
chased merchandise. Therefore, he apparently sought to ensure only that the
quality of advertised goods would equal the quality which was advertised.2
For a scheme to fall within this limited intent, a customer must be misled
as to the characteristics of the merchandise offered, an issue which does not
arise in the Glubo-type advertisment. The prosecution never alleged that
consumers were deceived concerning the quality of the advertised machineO
27. See Commissioner v. Acker, 80 Sup. Ct 144, 147 (1959) ("The law is settled
... that one 'is not to be subject to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly
impose it."); Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311-13 (1941) (congressional intent
controlling).
28. [T]he fact to which we gave such serious consideration when the act vas drawn
still remains, namely: that the person or concern that makes representations to the
public in an advertisement regarding his own wares is in a better position than any-
one else to know the quality and nwrits of the goods he advertises ... [A]ll rea-
sonable precautions ... [should be] taken by him to avoid the purchase of his
merchandise under any -Lisapprehension or mistake as to its quality or character.
Letter From H. D. Nims to Editor of Printer's Ink, in Ringing the Changes on the
Word "Knoingly," Printer's Ink, May 26, 1921, p. 125. (Emphasis added.)
I should consider it of paramount importance that persons who advertise should
be held responsible for the accuracy of the description of their wares, and that to
do otherwise would be to place a premium on giving to the public careless and
inaccurate descriptions of the quality and efficacy of the articles advertised.
Letter From H. D. Nims to Isidor Grossman, Counsel, Cleveland Ad Club, in Printer's
Ink, Jan. 30, 1913, p. 95. (Emphasis added.)
29. The court below placed great emphasis on the fact that the $29.50 machine did
not meet the advertised claims. "[T]he advertised machine instead of being 'top quality,'
actually was of 'bottom quality' ...." 5 App. Div. 2d at 537, 174 N.Y.S2d at 168. The
Court of Appeals, however, noted that the defendants were not charged with nor were
they tried for conspiracy to advertise falsely the quality of the "9.50 machine. The true
capabilities of the $29.50 machine were not litigated. 5 N.Y.2d at 469, 158 N.E-2d at 704,
186 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
Most likely the district attorney did not litigate the issue of the quality of the adver-
tised machine because he wanted to confront the court squarely with the issue of whether
1960]
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Nor was a claim made that the more expensive item which was switched was
not worth the price paid.30 Thus, the injury caused by bait advertising, as
represented by Ghtbo, is not the same injury which the Printer's Ink model
statute was designed to prevent.
To attribute the motive of the draftsman of a model act to the various
state legislatures that followed his blueprint may be unreasonable, however.
Nonetheless, it has been authoritatively held in two jurisdictions that the local
Printer's Ink acts aim at misrepresentation of quality or characteristics only.31
And the twelve state legislatures, which, unlike New York's,3 2 have specifically
brought bait advertising within Printer's Ink's criminal sanctions, would seem
to share that understanding.3 3 On the other hand, the Glubo court found a
"sweeping intent of the [New York] Legislature to make it unlawful to
advertise as a fact that which is not a fact."'3 4 The swiftness with which
Printer's Ink was almost universally enacted 3r suggests concurrence with the
idea that the statute, in most jurisdictions, evinces such a "sweeping" purpose to
eradicate any and all deceptive advertising devices. Thus, it may be no more
valid to argue that state legislatures did not "intend" to reach bait advertising
than to argue that they did not "intend" to reach advertisements over tele-
vision.
In any event, application of Printer's Ink-type statutes to bait advertising,
whether through judicial action invoking the authority of the New York Court
of Appeals or through legislative amendment, will probably be forthcoming
in an increasing number of jurisdictions.3 0 Before examining whether such
statutes are the most efficacious way to eliminate the use of bait, it will be
instructive to assay the nature of the injury involved. 7
bait advertising was covered -by the Printer's Ink statute. Had the court found that the
quality of the $29.50 machine had been misrepresented, it might have sustained the con-
viction without ever reaching the question of bait advertising.
30. Id. at 471, 158 N.E.2d at 705, 186 N.Y.S2d at 35.
31. Territory v. Lerner, 36 Hawaii 244 (1942) (false allegation of bankruptcy sale
not within Printer's Ink) ; State v. 'Andrew Schoch Grocery Co., 193 Minn. 91, 92, 257
N.W. 810, 811 (1934) (false allegation that high wages paid to employees not within
Printer's Ink).
32. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
33. Of the 13 statutes collected in note 17 supra, all but New York's make bait ad-
vertising a criminal offense.
34. 5 N.Y.2d at 471, 158 N.E.2d at 705, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
35. Within ten years after its promulgation, 21 states had enacted the model statute.
By 1927, 38 states had enacted the model statute, or variations of it. See Comment, 36
YALE L.J. 1155, 1157-59 (1927).
36. This trend is indicated by the fact that, of the 13 states that have passed specific
legislation aimed at bait advertising, see note 17 sipra, 1 acted in 1953 (Massachusetts),
3 in 1955 (California, Hawaii, and Tennessee), 1 in 1956 (Rhode Island), 2 in 1957
(Maryland and Michigan), 3 in 1958 (Georgia, Illinois, and New York) and 3 more In
1959 (Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Missouri).
37. The person generally thought to be injured 'by bait advertising is the consumer.
See, e.g., N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, at 1808 (McKinney) (message from the Governor) ("to
cheat consumers by means of viscious sales promotional practices."). But it has been said
[Vol. 69:8M0
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Bait advertising does not, of itself, involve the same injury which the
Printer's Ink model statute was designed to prevent, since the quality of
the item sold (the switched product) may not be misrepresented. But when
the quality of the switched product is falsified by the advertiser,38 it might
be argued that the original advertisement caused the consumer to buy a
misrepresented item. The actual misrepresentation occurs, however, not in
the bait advertisement but at the time of sale. Direct oral representations of
quality in a store or home have never been held to fall within the ambit of
a Printer's Ink statute,3 9 apparently because violations often turn upon slight
variations in the phrasing of the advertisement. 40 Wording can be readily
ascertained when the advertisement is available in printed form, and easily
established when broadcast, but the remarks of a salesman or a switching
seller can rarely be proved with exactness. Of course, bait advertising may
be condemned on grounds other than misrepresented quality. By playing
upon the consumer's desire for a bargain, bait arouses his interest in the item
offered.4 ' Once the consumer has become purchase-minded, the seller en-
counters less difficulty in selling a higher priced version of the product. Real-
istically, bait advertising is thus a highly effective method of overcoming both
consumer inertia and resistance. But this could not be the reason for its
illegality; unprohibited selling devices, such as door-to-door selling, may be
almost as effective in accomplishing the Same objective.12 Official antipathy to
bait advertising, which involves some of the elements of common-law fraud,43
must, therefore, rest on its supposed offensiveness to the moral and ethical
sensitivities of the community."
that it "is not only unfair to consumers, but to responsible small business." N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1957, at 1716 (McKinney) (message from the Governor).
38. The Fight Against Bait Advertisig 3 ("iT]his new machine may be a little-
known brand, and the 'bargain' price at which it is offered may actually be an expensive
price for the merchandise.") ; see Walker, Be-ware the "Bait-Ad" Gyp, Reader's Digest,
Aug. 1953, p. 98.
39. See State v. Cusick, 248 Iowa 1168, 84 N.W.2d 554 (1957) (telephone solicita-
tion not covered by statute). The statute specifically includes only printed publications
and broadcasts. See note 9 supra. An application of the ejusdem gneris rule would there-
fore seem to preclude an oral misrepresentation. See 1959 Committee Retort 189 ("[The
Printer's Ink statute] still probably does not cover representations made orally.. .").
40. See, e.g., People v. Wahl, 39 Cal. App. 2d 771, 100 P2d 550 (Super. Ct. App.
Dep't 1940); People v. Minjac Corp., 4 N.Y2d 320, 151 N.E.2d 180. 175 N.Y.S.-d 16
(1958).
41. See Rude v. United States, 74 F2d 673, 676 (10th Cir. 1935). ("It is common
knowledge nothing is more alluring than the expectation of getting vwhat is commonly
called a bargain, and a scheme which holds out that one will receive greater value than
he pays for, appeals to the avarice of many.").
'42. See Whyte How Eddie and I Cleaned Up, in EDrroRs OF FoxrurE, Way Do
PEOPLa Buy? 85-98 (1953).
43. See notes 2-8 supra.
44. Other possible injuries that might be argued include: the money spent on the
switched product would have afforded the consumer more satisfaction if spent elsewhere,
see note 53 infra and accompanying text; the consumer suffers a loss of time, see note
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No matter what the reason for combating bait advertising, a Printer's Ink
type statute designed for the relatively clear-cut case of misrepresentation of
quality will, at best, do the job poorly. Since such a statute does not define
the offense of bait advertising it will provide no guidance for businessman
or court. In traditional Printer's Ink cases, a violation occurs when the actual
and represented quality of the goods differ.45 When bait is involved, an ob-
jective test, such as comparative quality, cannot be utilized; rather the
subjective element of intent not to sell must be proved. But Glubo, destined
to be a leading case in an emerging area, does not make clear what facts will
be necessary to establish such intent in future cases. In Glubo two facts were
offered for this purpose-the seller's disparagement of the item offered and
his attempt to switch the customer to another model.40  The opinion does not
indicate whether both elements need be present to sustain a conviction. For
example, a seller may praise a more expensive machine without even mention-
ing the bait which attracted the consumer to the store, or he may allow the
consumer to examine the advertised machine relying upon its obvious in-
feriority to discourage sale. In either case a switched sale might result
without the element of disparagement but it is unknown whether "switching"
alone will establish an intent not to sell. Moreover, without a definition of
bait advertising, the Printer's Ink sanctions may be applied to the common
practice of loss leader selling.47 A loss leader is an item, priced below seller's
cost, which is designed to attract customers into the store. Unlike the typical
bait situation, the advertiser is willing to sell the item offered, since he hopes
to reap his profits through the sale of additional, rather than substituted, pro-
ducts.48 But the quantity of loss leaders available may be limited. If supply
is insufficient to meet reasonably anticipated demand, it might be argued that
the advertiser did not "intend to sell" to a percentage of those who responded
to his ad. Thus, a violation of the statute might hinge upon a particular court's
determination of the percentage required before intent not to sell could be
inferred.4 9
57 infra and accompanying text; loss of a potential customer by the successful bait seller's
competitors, see note 60 infra and accompanying text; and loss of good will by the manu-
facturer of the product used as bait, see note 66 infra and accompanying text.
45. E.g., People v. Austin, 301 Mich. 456, 3 N.W.2d 841 (1942); State v. Gitelman,
221 Minn. 122, 21 N.W.2d 198 (1945).
46. 5 N.Y.2d at 467, 158 N.E.2d at 705, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 31-32.
47. "Most newspapers and radio stations refuse bait ads but they are hard to spot.
For example, the best of firms regularly run 'price leader' ads which are real and honest
bargains to bring you into their stores, where you are likely to buy other items at regular
cost." Buschman, Bait Ads, 1954, p. 8.
48. See Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 569, 161 N.E.2d 197, 204,
190 N.Y.S.2d 977, 988 (1959) ; Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores, 113 F. Supp. 31,
43 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
49. The difficulty of such a determination can be avoided by requiring a seller of a




Aside from these problems of uncertainty, which can be remedied more or
less easily, a criminal statute such as Printer's Ink will not effectuate a legis-
lative decision to eliminate bait advertising. Juries are often reluctant to
stigmatize a man as a criminal solely for false advertising.50 More important,
local law enforcement officials, faced with limited resources, have largely
ignored the misdemeanor of false advertising and have primarily allocated their
facilities to the prosecution of more serious crimesP't Since bait certainly
involves no greater public injury than other forms of deceptive advertising, it
is unlikely that they will be more disposed to prosecute the bait advertiser.
In fact, they may be less willing to undertake prosecution of this crime, since
it will be more difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the "intent not
to sell" necessary for a bait conviction than to prove the discrepancy in quality
required in the usual Printer's Ink case. Probable lack of enforcement, then,
indicates that the present criminal statutes are not the most effective method
of controlling bait advertising.
One possible alternative is a statute allowing baited consumers to bring
an action for treble or minimum damages.52 Treble damages are not feasible,
however, since no actual damages on which they could be based exist in the
ordinary bait advertising situation. True, if the switched item is misrepre-
sented, damages might be measured by the difference between the expected
and received value. On the other hand, even if such damages are, in fact, the
result of the bait advertisment, no pecuniary loss would result when the
switched item is worth its price, as was the case in Ghtlbo. Even so, a con-
sumer might argue that he was nonetheless financially injured because the
bait so diminished his sales resistance that he purchased an item he would
not otherwise have bought: in other words, because the amount of dollars
he spent for the switched item above the amount he would have been originally
willing to pay for the purchased product in the open market affords him less
satisfaction than the same amount of dollars would if spent for other items.53
But even if such damage could be satisfactorily measured, legal recognition
is unlikely. Otherwise, all advertising would be susceptible to the same attack,
50. See Handler, Proposals for Changing the Law of New York on Unfair Com-
petition and False Advertising, in N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'x, 1959 ANTITRUsT LAw Svsi'osw'j
173, 177 (1959).
51. 1959 Committee Report 190; see SPEcAL COUM. oF THE AN.TimRusT SEcTio. OF
THE N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'x To STDY THE ANTrMrusT LAws op Nmv Yor, Srcota
REPoRT 71a-93a (1959).
52. Cf. Emergency Price Control Act § 205(e), ch. 521, 56 Stat. 34 (1942).
Such a statute has been proposed in New York on several occasions. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 10, 1956, p. 23, col. 1; id., Jan. 29, 1957, p. 14, col. 7; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958. at 1808
(McKinney) (Governor's message). The bill would have allowed persons defrauded by
tradesmen to sue for treble damages plus reasonable attorney's fees. No indication was
given, however, of how damages would be computed.
53. See 1 FAmcHiLD, Fumciss & Bucic, ELEmENTARY ECONOM ICS 140 (3d ed. 1936);
BOULDmG, EcoNo nIc AxALYsis 638-48 (1941); SAimu-.soN, Economics 424-26 (3d ed.
1955).
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with bait singled out only because of its greater effectiveness. Possibly, the
legislature could set a flat statutory amount, recoverable even in the absence
of financial loss. While little precedent exists for such a statute it would
probably be constitutional on an analogy to the qui tam action. 4 But consumers
may not be able to distinguish bait from other advertising techniques, and
may be unaware of their statutory rights. Even when these defects are over-
come by adequate publicity, the expense of litigation would discourage suits
unless the recoverable amount were large, while the bait advertiser would
regard the expense of an occasional suit as a cost of doing business. Raising
the penalty to overcome these difficulties would create other problems.06 First,
courts and juries might be reluctant to impose harsh penalties on businessmen,
except in the most blatant cases; indeed, penalties which might lead to bank-
ruptcy do not seem justified for a retailer who is not an habitual bait user.
Furthermore, such a statute would be penal in nature; strict construction
might allow bait advertisers to escape punishment. 0 In any event, a con-
sumer-enforcement scheme would probably provide no remedy if the switched
item is not purchased-if the consumer has not been "taken." Although bait
may mislead a consumer into a futile attempt to buy the advertised item, a
frustrated would-be purchaser would suffer only a loss of time, which a
court or legislature probably would not convert into monetary damages."?
The defects of consumer enforcement could be avoided by a statute authoriz-
ing competitor suits for treble damages, but additional problems would be
raised by this remedy. A civil action could be based on the theory that bait
advertising is a form of unfair competition. 8 But if the evil of bait advertising
54. This was an action brought by an "informer" under a statute which established
a penalty for the commission or omission of some act. The informer would divide the
penalty with the state. BLAcK, LAw Dic~ioNAaY 1414 (4th ed. 1957) ; see State ex rel.
Rodes v. Warner, 19P Mo. 650, 663, 94 S.W. 962, 965 (1906).
55. If the statute imposed what were deemed to be excessive penalties it might vio-
late the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934). The greater the disproportion between actual damage and
the statutory amount, the greater the likelihood of its being held unreasonable and exces-
sive.
The fine under the New York version of the Printer's Ink statute is only $500.
56. See Steam-Engine -Co. v. Hubbard, 101 U.S. 188 (1879). In New York and sev-
eral other states, however, this rule has been modified. E.g., N.Y. PFN. LAW § 21 (penal
statutes are not to be strictly construed but are to be given the "fair import of... [their]
terms").
57. Compare B.V.D. Co. v. Davega-City Radio, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 659, 661 (S.D.
N.Y. 1936) ("It may be true that the purchaser ...had lost nothing but his time and
the effort required for shopping, and that such deception of the public alone would not be
sufficient basis for maintenance of this action -by the complainants.").
If the statute allowed any reader of the advertisement to sue no limit would exist on
the number of possible plaintiffs. Even if the statute only gave those who actually visited
the store standing to sue, the number might be quite large.
58. See Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 571, 161 N.E.2d 197, 206,
190 N.Y.S.2d 977, 989 (1959) ("[Bait advertising] does not fall with precision into any
previous groupings of unfair competition. But this is no reason to deny justice or
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is that it induces consumers to purchase goods which they would not normally
have bought,59 its victims would not be in the market for a competitor's
product. Viewed differently, however, bait advertising might give rise to
injury to competitors. Some people who are attracted by bait advertising's
promise of a bargain are in fact in the market for the switched product. While
this consumer is not "injured" by the purchase of a more expensive item,
the nonbait seller will have lost a potential customer.00 Nonetheless, a par-
ticular competitor would rarely be able to prove actual damages 01 which could
be based only on a diminution of profits. In the field of small consumer dur-
ables, where bait advertising is most prevalent, 62 a causal relation between such
diminution and the bait advertisement would be difficult to establish; profits
react to a multiplicity of variables, such as fluctuations in the business cycle,
technological change, the availability of credit, and the entrance of new com-
petitors. Additionally, the fact that bait advertising is usually disseminated
throughout an entire metropolitan area compounds the difficulty of determining
its effect on any one competitor. While these handicaps probably negate the
value of this treble damage remedy, a competitor, although not actually dam-
aged, might be allowed to enjoin bait advertising. In fact, one commentator
has suggested that all false advertising be enjoinable as a "competitive tort."03
But this injunctive procedure would probably be infrequently used; a single
competitor would, absent a financial incentive, hesitate before undertaking
what might prove to be lengthy and expensive litigation. Perhaps a trade
association with greater resources would be more likely to bring an injunctive
action.64 In any event, injunctions without further penalties, while preventing
violations by the same individual, would probably have little deterrent effect
equity."); Buschman, Bait Ads, 1954, p. 8. The basic objectives of the law relating to
unfair competition is "first, to protect the honest trader in the business which fairly be-
longs to him; second, to punish the dishonest trader, who is taking his competitor's busi-
ness by unfair means; third, to protect the public from deception." Atlas Mffg. Co. v.
Street & Smith, 204 Fed. 398, 405 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 755 (1913).
Possibly a retailer or manufacturer could bring an action for unfair competition against
a bait advertiser, who is involved in interstate commerce and using a brand name product
as bait, under Lanham Act § 43(a), 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1958), which
provides that any person who uses any false description or representation of brand-name
goods in interstate commerce shall be liable to a civil action by any person who believes
that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of such false representation or descrip-
tion. See L'Aigloa Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954).
59. See text preceding note 53 supra.
60. Cf. FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922) ; Ford Motor C. v.
FTC, 120 F2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941).
61. See Callmann, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 CoLua.. L R=. 876
(1948); Nims, Damages and Accounting Procedures in Unfair Compelition Cases, 31
•CoRqxLL L.Q. 431 (1946).
62. See note 12 supra.
63. Callmann, supra note 61.
64. All major fields of retailing have trade associations. Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 168,
174 n.36 (1959).
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upon future violators O5 since they may be able to garner substantial profits
before an injunction issues.
The only other private party who could bring an action against a bait
advertiser would be the manufacturer of a product used as bait. If a brand-
name product is openly disparaged, its manufacturer could seek an injunction
and possible damages by invoking the doctrine of trade libel.00 Or, use of a
manfacturer's brand name in the bait advertisement itself could conceivably
be regarded as an expropriation of the manufacturer's goodwill, sufficient
perhaps to allow a cause of action for the common law tort of unfair competi-
tion. But damages again will be difficult to establish,0 7 and the bait advertiser
may be able to retain the profits he has reaped before the issuance of an
injunction. More important, the possibility of such actions would not affect
the numerous bait advertisers who do not use a brand-name product as bait.,,
And actions for trade libel would not affect those schemes which attempt
to switch the customer without disparaging the advertised item.
Since neither public criminal prosecution nor various forms of individual
civil action will effectively control bait advertising, the obvious alternative
is civil enforcement by the state. A state agency, entrusted with the respon-
sibility of controlling bait selling,69 could be given the power to issue a cease-
and-desist order, backed up by the contempt sanction, upon the finding of a
violation. In order that this cease-and-desist order would have greater deterrent
impact than other possible injunctive remedies, 70 the agency should be given
authority to seek financial penalties, up to a statutory maximum. The agency's
power should be used in proportion to an offender's degree of culpability. For
example, an isolated instance of bait advertising might result only in a warning
and a request that the advertiser refund the customer's money; more serious
65. Like other conclusions about deterrence, this prediction must remain unverified.
See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Vislbillty
Decisions in the Adminstration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 570 n.55 (1960).
66. See 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS I 43.3(b) (2) (2d
ed. 1950); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 626-28 (1938); Note, 13 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 468
(1945). See also Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 168, 182 (1959).
In Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E.2d 197, 190 N.Y.S.2d
977 (1959), an unfair competition action, a vacuum-cleaner manufacturer sued a retailer
who purchased the manufacturer's old trade-ins, rebuilt them, and then advertised them
at very attractive prices. After gaining admittance to homes, salesmen would disparage
the advertised machine and try to switch the customer to other models. These practices
were enjoined. Although the case was distinguished from one of "disinterested trade
libel" the basis for granting the injunction was to prevent destruction of good will. See
Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores, 141 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
67. See Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., supra note 66, at 572, 161 N.E.2d at
206, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
68. See The Fight Against Bait Advertising 3.
69. In this manner, the problem resulting from lack of enforcement of criminal stat-
utes by public prosecutors with general responsibility to combat crime would be alleviated.
See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
70. See text at notes 65, 66 supra.
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violations would be enjoined and, if a history of bait advertising appeared,
the violator subjected to financial penalties.71  Although the availability of
financial penalties may render this scheme "penal in nature," the possibility
that it would be judicially vitiated by strict construction 72 could be avoided
by detailed agency regulations, which would probably be given considerable
weight by the courts. A precise statutory definition of bait advertising would
be rendered unnecessary if an agency were made responsible for enforcement;
the agency could issue its own definitions, or in time would develop sufficient
expertise to distinguish legitimate practices, such as loss leader selling, from
the subtle schemes which the bait advertiser may devise.73
Admittedly, a "Bait Advertising Commission" would probably not be viable.
But the prevention of bait advertising might be assigned to an agency designed
to combat deceptive advertising or "consumer fraud" in general, 74 or to an
existing state body, such as the departments of agriculture or commerce.7 5
71. A newly established Bureau of Consumer Frauds in the Office of the Attorney
General of New York will stress refund and returns, but if systematic cheating appears
it will be prosecuted. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1958, p. 56, col. 1. The bureau is staffed with
seven professional people, six of whom are lawyers. Volunteers man the offices in the
evenings. SPECL Coma. OF ax ANTrTUST SECTION OF TaE N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N
To STUDY THE ANrrrMusT LAws or NEw Yorx, SECOND REaOr 45a (1959).
72. See text at note 56 supra.
73. Such flexibility is necessary because "there is no hard and fast line where bait
advertising leaves off and the advertising of a genuine bargain begins." FTC, Press Re-
lease, Bargain on a String, Dec. 4, 1955, p. 2. Perhaps the standards recently adopted
by the FTC could be used for this purpose. FTC, Guides Against Bait Advertising, 24
Fed. Reg. 9755 (1959).
74. See Annual Message of the Governor, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, at 1809 (McKin-
ney) (proposal for a department of consumer protection) ; N.Y. Times, April 19, 1959,
p. 53, col. 33 (proposal for Connecticut Consumers Bureau); Note, The Rcgulaion of
Advertising, 56 CoLum. L Rav. 1018, 1077 (1956).
In New York, the Attorney General established a Bureau of Consumer Frauds be-
cause "bait advertising and related frauds practiced upon consumers have become a major
problem." N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1957, p. 22, col. 5. The Bureau will "enforce compliance
with all laws enacted for the protection of the consumer." Id., Oct. 15, 1957, p. 35, col. 3.
The head of the Bureau said that "'bait advertising' is the most common form of con-
summer fraud." Id., Jan. 12, 1958, § 1, p. 56, col. 1. This bureau received 1,000 com-
plaints in its first 10 weeks of operation. Id., Jan. 7, 1958, p. 32, col. 2. When the Printer's
Ink statute was first presented, Mr. Nims, the draftsman, stated a need for a "central
organization whose business is to prosecute fraudulent advertisers relentlessly." Printer's
Ink, Nov. 16, 1911, p. 20.
75. See, e.g., MfrxN. STAT. tAxx. § 620.52 (Supp. 1959) (enforcement by Commis-
sioner of Agriculture). The jurisdictions having such specialized enforcement bodies have
reported the greatest number of prosecutions for false advertising under the Printer's Ink
statute. Note, Tie Regtdation of Advertising, 56 COLua. L Ray. 1018, 1064 n.281 (1956).
A state trade commission has been rejected by Professor Handler in favor of "exist-
ing enforcement officials and traditional judicial procedures" on the ground that the "latter
would be more expeditious and economical....." Handler, Proposals for Changing 11
Arew York Law on Unfair Competition and False Advertising, in N.Y. STATE BAn Ass'n,
1959 AN TRuST LAw Svxvositm 173, 178-79 (1959).
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Even if no administrative structure is adopted, existing criminal statutes would
be made more effective if a designated arm of the state prosecution machinery
were made primarily responsible for enforcing such legislation.70
The foregoing has assumed that the states are free to control bait advertis-
ing.7 7 Arguably, however, regulation of advertising carried on through inter-
state media is preempted by specific federal legislation. The Federal Com-
munication Commission can regulate radio and television advertising through
its power to revoke the station's broadcast license.7 8 But the FCC has been
reluctant to impose revocation on broadcasters for the advertisements they
76. Additionally, the media and the advertisers could assist statutory prohibitions with
a program of self regulation. For an extensive discussion and evaluation of existing efforts
at self regulation, see Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 -CoLum. L. REv. 1018,
1078-96 (1956). In the newspaper field such papers as the New York Times and the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch maintain self-imposed standards of acceptability. THAYva, LEoAL
CONTROL OF THE PRESs § 86, at 591, 597 (1956). The New York Times specifically refuses
to accept bait offers. Id. at 599. Furthermore, New York radio and television stations, at
the instigation of the Better Business Bureaus, have adopted a six-point set of copy
standards designed to eliminate bait advertising. Printer's Ink, March 18, 1955, p. 28. This
code has virtually eliminated bait advertising over television in New York City. SIECIM,
COMM. OF THE ANTITRUST SECTION OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N To STUDY TiHE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS OF NEW YoRx, SECOND REPORT 44a (1959). The National tAssociation of
Radio and Television Broadcasters also passed a resolution aimed at preventing bait ad-
vertising. "If the policy of the advertiser is to offer higher-priced models or types of the
product in addition to the featured item, this fact is to be clearly and prominently set
forth in the advertisement." Printer's Ink, March 18, 1955, p. 28.
Printer's Ink has stressed self enforced standards as the best cure and they find the
prospect of further governmental regulation will be extremely distasteful to advertisers.
Printer's Ink, Nov. 9, 1956, pp. 80-84. But doubt has recently been expressed on the ability
of the industry to police itself, at least as far as radio and television advertising are con-
cerned. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1959, p. 1, col. 2; id., Nov. 6, 1959, p. 17, col. 4.
77. It might be argued that state regulation -would constitute an unconstitutional bur-
den on interstate commerce. See Post Printing & Publishing Co. v. Brewster, 246 Fed.
321 (D. Kan. 1917) (state statute forbidding cigarette advertisements in newspapers such
a burden). But absent an overriding interest in national uniformity, see Southern Pac.
Ry. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1.945), states may enact police-power regulations (which
include attacks on misleading advertising, see State v. Rones, 223 La. 839, 67 So. 2d 99
(1953)) incidentally affecting interstate commerce, see, e.g., Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S.
439 (1938). Moreover, bait advertising is usually a local phenomenon. See The Fight
Against Bait Advertising 2; Where May We Ask Was the FCC?, Consumer Reports,
Jan. 1960, pp. 9-11; Gwynne, The Better Business Bureaus and the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 702, 707 (1957).
78. The FCC is given the authority to grant a broadcast license when such issuance
will further the "public convenience, interest or necessity." 48 Stat. 1083 (1936), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1958).'For examples of advertising which has been dis-
approved, but not made the basis of revocation, see In the Matter of Broadcast of Pro-
grams Advertising Alcoholic Beverages, 5 RADIO REG. 593 (FCC 1949) (liquor); WRBL
Radio Station, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 687 (1936) '(lotteries); Knickenbocker Broadcasting Co.,
2 F.C.C. 76 (1935) (contraceptive devices) ; Farmers & Bankers Life Ins. Co., 2 F.C.C.
455 (1936) (false and misleading advertisements); Ben S. McGlashan, 2 F.C.C. 145
(1935) (false and misleading advertisements).
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accept.79 Moreover, any possible FCC-state conflict would be negligible; the
federal agency regulates the stations while the states would act only against
the advertiser. Unlike the FCC, however, the FTC does act directly against
the bait advertiser.8 0 Preemption, however, should not necessarily be inferred.
Although courts have articulated numerous verbal formulas to indicate under
what circumstances preemption occurs,8 ' the subject matter of the state regu-
lation and the nature of state's interest therein have usually been the decisive
factor in determining the validity of such regulation. The state has long
been regarded as primarily responsible for the protection of its citizens against
fraud.8 2 Moreover, while the FTC has recently indicated its increased interest
79. WSBC, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 293 (1936) (license renewed despite continued broadcasting
of advertisement for which the advertiser had been convicted under the Pure Food and
Drug Act). K.FKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C.
Cir. 1931), is the only license nonrenewal in the past 29 years.
Recently, Chairman Doerfer expressed the view that the FCC had no power to make
the stations stop frauds or other improper practices. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1959, p. 1, col.
6. But the FCC has considered asking for new powers. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 11,
1959, p. 1, col 3.
80. The FCC has the power to enjoin advertising which constitutes an unfair method
of competition or amounts to a deceptive practice. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5,
38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958). Bait advertising has been
held within the scope of § 5. E.g., Oregon Hearing Center, 52 F.T.C. 1192 (1956);
Clean-Rite Vacuum Stores, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 887 (1955); Bond Sewing Stores, 51 F.T.C.
470 (1954). Furthermore, if the advertisement involves food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics,
it may be enjoined if it is misleading in a material respect. 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§ 55(a) (1) (1958).
81. Among the more common "tests" are the following:
(1) The Conflict Test---"... in the application of this principle of supremacy of
an act of Congress in a case where the State law is but the exercise of a reserved
power, the repugnance of conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two acts
could not be reconciled or consistently stand together ... ." Sinnot Y. Davenport,
22 How. (U.S.) 227,243 (1859).
(2) The Coincidence Test-"jWhen Congress has taken the particular subject-mat-
ter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition .. . ." Charleston & W.C.
Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915).
(3) The Dominance Test-"... the Act of Congress may touch a field in which
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to pre-
clude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
(4) The Pervasiveness Test-"The scheme of federal regulation may be so per-
vasive as to make no room for the States to supplement it" Ibid.
(5) The Conflict in Administration Test-". . . enforcement of [the state law]
presents a serious danger of conflict with the administration of the federal pro-
gram." Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956).
Cramton, Pennsylvania v. Nelson: A Case Study in Federal Preemption, 26 U. Cm. L
Rv. 85, 87 n.8 (1958).
82. See Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 472, 478 (1894) (adulterated food);
Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U.S. 189 (1904) (same); Note, The Regulation of Advrlis-
ing, 56 COLum. L. Rxv. 1018, 1076 (1956) ("The drastic effect of preemption would seem
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in bait advertising,83 it has neither the funds nor personnel to pursue every
violation,8 4 even if prosecution of small local advertisers is part of its proper
function. Preemption would result in a "no man's land" in which the states
cannot, and the federal government will not, act. Congress has recently dis-
approved the existence of such a "no man's land" in the area of labor re-
lations 85 and would hardly condone the establishment of a similar zone in
an area in which, to say the least, no greater federal interest exists. There-
fore, at least until the FTC expands its activities against bait advertising, a
system of complementary federal and state control seems desirable.80 But
until the public learns to guard against its own credulity, even a concerted
attack will not wholly eliminate bait advertising.8 7 No agency will be able to
prevent every form of deception which the ingenious bait advertiser may
devise; in the long run bait advertising will be prevented only through con-
sumer education.88
harmful to any comprehensive system of local advertising control . . because it would
unnecessarily exclude state action in essentially local matters and would severely diminish
necessary state police powers."). See also SPECIAL COMx. OF THE AmnTRUST SEcrION
OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWs OF NEv YORK, SECOND
REPORT 52a-53a (1959) (statement of FTC Chairman Gwynne: "In the deceptive prac-
tices field @articularly, the local practices parallel interstate practices in which action has
been taken. As to our policy distinguished from our jurisdiction, I might point out that
we rarely assert jurisdiction where commerce is minimal and the business and practices
are primarily local.").
83. The FTC adopted "Guides Against Bait Advertising" on November 24, 1959. 24
Fed. Reg. 9755 (1959) ; see FTC, Press Release, 'Bargain on a String, Dec. 4, 1955,
84. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1959, p. 46, col. 3. (FTC's funds described as "grossly
inadequate").
85. See Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, § 701, 73 Stat. 541,
29 U.S.C.A. § 164(c) (1) (Supp. 1959).
86. See Ritholz v. Ammon, 240 Wis. 578, 590, 4 N.W.2d 173, 178 (1942) ("We con-
sider that the state may regulate the trade practices of such businesses, subject, perhaps,
to a loss of jurisdiction where the . . . [FTC] in a particular case has undertaken
regulation within the federal act.").
87. See Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L.J. 22, 51 (1929).
88. See The Fight Against Bait Advertising 4 '("The most important weapon against
bait advertising is a buying public that is well informed about it."). Such an educational
campaign is presently carried on to some degree by the FTC, Better Business Bureaus,
and private consumer groups. See Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLumr. L.
Rsv. 1018, 1093 (1956).
